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Mythic and theoretic aspects of the concept of ‘the unconscious’ in
popular and psychological discourse
by David Edwards
In Greek mythology, Typhon was the youngest
son of Gaea (the Earth) and Tartarus (the
underworld). Typhon was not a beautiful baby.
He was a grisly monster with a hundred dragons'
heads. He was one of the Titans, a group of
powerful and dangerous creatures who rebelled
against Zeus, the King of the Gods. The rebellion
was crushed and Typhon was imprisoned under
Mount Etna, the volcano in Sicily which was
active in classical times and remains active today.
It was said that when Typhon raged, the earth
shook and Etna erupted.
Many such tales from mythology from all over
world seem to dramatize aspects of our
relationship with potent forces of which we have
little understanding and over which we have little
control. Many of these forces are less concrete
than the forces of nature. They arise from our
apprehension of our existential predicaments, our
interpersonal vulnerability and the intensity of
our own psychological pain. In many
contemporary discourses this territory is referred
to more neutrally as ‘the unconscious;’ but the
unconscious will always elude our attempts to
capture it in words.
The point is made succinctly in this poem by
South African poet Don Maclennan (2002):
Poems are nets of thought
put out to catch
what can be sensed only
in a corner of the mind.
A poem never drains
its ground of silence.
Poems make you
see and touch and smell:
they bring the world closer
so you can live in it again.
Maclennan’s poem also points to the need we
have to contact and express what is unconscious
and eludes our verbal definitions. So
psychotherapists have always turned to metaphor
and myth in their attempts to capture and
communicate about it.
We see this in the eloquent theoretical chapter
written by Freud’s mentor, Josef Breuer, in
Studies on hysteria, who refers to the Titan myth.
How can it be, he asks, that we can at times have
an intense and unexpected emotional reactions to
an event? It is, he suggests, quoting from
Goethe’s Faust, that
‘part of the mind [is] thrust into
darkness, as the Titans are imprisoned
in the crater of Etna. [From there they]
can shake the earth but can never
emerge into the light of day.’
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It is, he suggests, unconscious ideas’ that are
responsible for these inexplicable, unreasonable
changes of feeling …
the split-off mind acts like a sounding-
board to the note of a tuning fork. Any
event that provokes unconscious
memories liberates the whole affective
force of these ideas … [which] is then
quite out of proportion to any that would
have arisen in the conscious mind
alone (Breuer 1895: 229, 237).
Robert Langs has argued that the fact of the
unconscious is an evolutionary compromise.
With the emergence of the hominids, and
especially homo sapiens, increased intelligence
and the development of language enhanced the
capacity for emotional differentiation and
sensitivity. The deepening of attachments, which
were the basis for ensuring that parents
maintained interest in their children through the
long years of childhood, intensified experiences
of separation and loss. Furthermore, with the
development of foresight, the anticipation of
one’s own death and that of one’s loved ones
became unbearably painful. In addition, ‘a deep
unconscious fear-guilt subsystem’ (1996: 170)
evolved to provide a protective mechanism
against the risk of individuals becoming violent
and murderous towards their own family and
group members. As a result a complex array of
difficult ‘emotionally charged impingements’
(Langs 1996: 134) became a routine part of the
life of any human being. For all of this activity of
‘the emotion processing mind’ to remain
conscious would overload the conscious system
which was essential for ensuring individual and
group survival. Consequently, the ‘conscious
defensiveness’ (1966: 154) which is such a
central focus of most psychotherapy, became an
evolutionary necessity.
We human beings have a terribly limited
awareness of our emotional states, the real
motives behind what we do, and even of the
broader patterns and finer details of our everyday
behaviour. Human consciousness, Jung argued, is
but ‘a late-born descendent of the unconscious
psyche’ (1931a: 350), which had evolved in
response to the development of ‘civilized life’
with its demand for ‘concentrated, directed,
conscious functioning’ (1958b: 71), for an
internally consistent view of things and the need
to mould oneself into ‘an ideal image’ (1934:
155). Despite this obvious truth, in much of our
everyday discourse, both informal and academic,
we treat ourselves as rational goal directed
creatures with extensive conscious understanding
of our lives (and even more of the lives of other
people) and unlimited capacity for consciously
directed strategic control over our behaviour.
This sad delusion is often referred to as a ‘heroic’
view of human consciousness, a view that was
reinforced by the emergence of science in the
seventeenth century and came to be associated
with Descartes’ (1596-1650) famous phrase
‘cogito ergo sum’ (‘I think, therefore I am’).
History has been somewhat unfair to Descartes in
this respect. He was well aware of the power of
what he called ‘the imagination’ with its capacity
to manifest in dreams and poetry and shape the
deeper life of the soul. But the science to whose
founding he contributed wanted nothing to do
with the uncertainty and ambiguity inherent in
these aspects of human life and served to
reinforce the view that we could identify with our
rational conscious intelligence and so master
ourselves and the world.
For three hundred years, philosophers and poets,
and later psychologists and psychotherapists
would point to the contradictions inherent in this
midguided perspective. Although there were
attempts to incorporate theimagination as a
creative element into science, these were quickly
marginalized (Keller 1985). Science mistrusted
imagination as the thin end of a large wedge that
would legitimize superstition, and hence
undermine its goals. Whyte (1962) argues that
this simplistic and idealized elevation of the
conscious life led, over the next decades, to the
term ‘unconscious’ being used with increasing
frequency. In France, in 1675, Malebranche
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(1638-1715), an exponent of Descartes’ ideas,
observed that ‘the awareness we have of
ourselves does not perhaps reveal to us more than
the smaller part of our being.’ In England, in
1690, Malebranche’s follower, Norris (1657-
1711) observed ‘we may have ideas of which we
are not conscious.’ (Whyte 1962: 96-97). The
romantic poets continued to use the traditional
language that Descartes had drawn on: that of the
life of imagination and the workings of the soul.
In due course, however, the language of
imagination began to converge with the language
of unconscious processes. The poet, Coleridge
(1772-1834) spoke of the ‘twilight realms of
consciousness’ and articulated the ‘subtle
interplay between conscious and unconscious in
artistic creation’ (Whyte, 1962: 134). In 1860, the
Swiss writer Amiel (1821-1881) was the first
person to use the equivalent of ‘unconscious’ in
French, when he wrote of how dreams serve as a
‘reflection of the waves of the unconscious life in
the floor of the imagination’ (Whyte 1962: 156).
The concept of ‘the unconscious’ emerged in
Germany. Goethe (1749-1832), spoke of how the
Romantic imagination arises from ‘the
unconscious’ which is where a person’s ‘root
lives’. ‘Poetry sets out from the unconscious’,
wrote Goethe’s friend, the poet Schiller (1759-
1805), who, a century before Freud, ‘advised a
friend to release his imagination from the
restraint of critical reason by employing a flow of
free associations’ (Whyte 1962: 128, 129, 134).
Carus’ (1789-1869) influential book, Psyche, was
published in 1846. This distinguished between
different levels of the unconscious and was a
significant source for a nineteenth century best-
seller, von Hartmann’s (1842-1906) Philosophy
of the Unconscious. This discussed an absolute
unconscious, a physiological unconscious and a
psychological unconscious and went through
nine editions between 1869 and 1884 and the
twelfth edition was published posthumously as
late in 1923 (Ellenberger 1970; Klein 1977;
Schultz and Schultz 2000).
The paradoxes inherent in the limited conscious
knowledge we have of ourselves are captured as
effectively today by metaphors and images as
they were over a century ago. Back then, Josef
Breuer handed down to us another famous
metaphor. His patient, Anna O. used the
metaphor of “chimney sweeping” to refer to her
recovery during psychotherapy of traumatic
memories and her expression of the associated
emotions. Freud, too, drew extensively on
metaphors. He discussed tales of mediaeval nuns,
who suddenly uttered “violent blasphemies and
unbridled erotic language.” They must have
suppressed these unacceptable ideas, he
speculated, but, rather than being annihilated,
these ideas
enjoy an unsuspected existence in a
sort of shadow kingdom, till they
emerge like bad spirits and take control
of the body, which is as a rule under the
orders of the predominant ego-
consciousness (1893: 126-127).
Freud frequently used the metaphor of depth. In
the psychotherapy of Elizabeth von R., he speaks
of how he developed an approach “which we
liked to compare … with the technique of
excavating a buried city.” This involved “clearing
away the pathogenic psychical material layer by
layer”(1895b: 139). Elsewhere, he refers to
“ideas which are derived from the greatest depth”
(1895c: 300), and speaks of how, by approaching
“the material in the deeper layers” he hoped to
“discover … the connecting threads” (1895c:
293). Eugene Bleuler would use this metaphor
when he coined the phrase “depth psychology” to
refer to Freud’s psychoanalytic approach (Freud,
1914: 41).
All this suggests that the split between conscious
and unconscious is not just the consequence of
the development of science and cannot just be
blamed on Descartes. Robert Langs, whose
evolutionary theory of the unconscious we
referred to earlier, argues that language-based
thought developed two distinctive modes so that
some limited provision was made for the
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expression of the split-off contents of the
emotion-processing mind. The one mode is
‘paradigmatic/scientific’. This mode deals with
everyday formulation of experience and problem-
solving. As such, it ‘served science and our
search for logical truths and led to the emergence
of a theoretic culture.’ Alongside there evolved a
narrative mode, which provided the basis for a
‘mythic culture’ (1996: 132). In this mode,
‘shared anxieties and adaptive issues were dealt
with by collective story-telling and myths of
origin, death, warfare, kinship, and much more.’
These narratives indirectly express, and provide a
vehicle for processing, the emotional conflicts
and dilemmas which are not addressed directly in
everyday conversation. Myth and metaphor,
story-telling and poetry are not just interesting
cultural embellishments which emerge when
primates have time on their hands. They are the
central means, indeed the only means, through
which individuals can process the repressed
emotions evoked by the existential conditions
and interpersonal conflicts inherent in human
life.
Langs points out the serious disadvantages of this
arrangement and concludes that ‘the design of the
emotion-processing mind is ... fundamentally
flawed’ (1996: 109). Unconscious emotions give
rise to projection and distorted perceptions so
that
an enormous number of behaviours ...
are unwittingly dislocated from their true
origins and therefore misapplied and
maladaptive. We are remarkably
unaware of the deep motives related to
much of our emotional lives (1996:
170).
Thus, as a result of an evolutionary compromise,
which secured advantages to the species only at
great cost, it is our human predicament to suffer
from ‘the inherited disease of a dysfunctional
emotion-processing mind’ (1996: 194).
Mythology, then, is more than a set of old stories;
it dramatizes the fundamental struggles of the
human condition. This was central to Freud’s
genius. On his first visit to Paris in 1885, he was
impressed by the antique statues he saw in the
Louvre, and, later, acquired a collection of his
own (Gay, 1989). He keenly followed
archaeological discoveries, and frequently drew
attention to the way in which myth and drama
revealed the nature of the unconscious. ‘Here are
my masters,’ he said in 1926, as he showed a
visitor the works of Shakespeare and the Greek
tragedians on his shelves (Ellenberger 1970, p.
460). He was particularly pleased when his work
was honoured with the Goethe Prize and wrote
that the award letter recognized with unusual
clarity ‘the secret, personal intentions’ behind his
work (Freud 1930: 207).
Let us look at the ingredients of a famous mythic
tale, which fascinated Freud, in which many of
humanity’s worst fears take on the power of self-
fulfilling prophecies, and the protagonists,
despite their best efforts, do the very things
which are most appalling to them. A mother and
father feel they have no choice but to abandon
their newborn child, and leave him to die; a
young man feels he has no choice but to leave his
beloved parents, never to return; a father dreads
his son’s growing up, as he fears his son will
become stronger than him and may even kill him;
that son does indeed grow up and kill him; that
same son breaks the incest taboo and has sexual
relations with his mother; his mother, consumed
by horror and guilt, hangs herself.
This, of course, is the ancient Greek story of
Oedipus. A man who was raised by foster parents
in a foreign land returns to Thebes, the land of
his birth. On his arrival he gets into a fight with a
local man over who will pass first at a narrow
stretch of road and kills him. He does not know
that the local man is Laius, the king of Thebes.
He travels on to the city and finds its inhabitants
are oppressed by a monster, the Sphinx, who
ruthlessly controls it. Oedipus subdues this
creature and the grateful citizens, whose king has,
of course, just been killed, invite him to marry
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the queen, Jocasta, and become king himself.
Oedipus agrees. Now he is at his heroic zenith,
physically strong, intellectually gifted, a born
leader, admired by all. Yet he is poised on the
brink of catastrophe. Filled with righteous
indignation that the former king has been
murdered by a stranger, he orders a full
investigation into who was responsible. As pieces
of information are uncovered, a terrible tale
unfolds as Oedipus learns a series of unbearable
truths. At his birth, a prophecy had foretold that
he would kill his father, so his parents decided to
kill the infant and left him to die on a mountain
side. He had been found by a shepherd and
adopted and raised by the King of Corinth. When
he grows up, a prophet warns him that he is
destined to kill his father, so he leaves Corinth
and vows never to return. Now he learns the
awful truth — his real father was Laius, the king
he has replaced. Worse still, this was the man he
had killed on his arrival at Thebes. Added to this,
he has married and had sexual relations with his
own mother, Jocasta. Beneath the mask of the
admired hero is a seething cauldron of violence,
lust and greed and of emotional pain too
unbearable to contemplate in the clear light of
consciousness. The family is destroyed. Laius is
already dead. Jocasta hangs herself rather than
face the horror and shame, and Oedipus
symbolically blinds himself by plunging a long
pin into each eye. This terrible story helps us
understand why in many ways we are happier if
we are not aware of the truth, if much or our
psychological life is relegated to the realms of the
unconscious.
But Freud was caught in a cultural trap. Science
was not content with metaphor. Although the
central concepts of science such as energy, force
and field were metaphors, in the domain of
science they could be measured and mapped and
became real entities. Freud wanted the same for
the unconscious. This was thebasis of his famous
topographical model in which the human psyche
was divided into the conscious, the preconscious
and the unconscious, and his theories of the
vicissitudes to the transformation of the flow of
energy or libido within and between these
systems. This is where Freud became
increasingly dogmatic and where many
prominent colleagues could not accompany him.
Adler and Jung were each profoundly stimulated
by their conversations with Freud, but neither
ever used the language of Freud’s formal models.
Janet whose expertise in hypnotherapy can still
teach us much today, and who often used the
language of the unconscious, alienated Freud by
remarking that the idea of ‘the unconscious’ is
useful as a metaphor (façon de parler), but should
not be made into an entity in its own right, as
Freud had done (Watson: 1968).
Adler’s quarrel with Freud was totally different.
He did not share Freud’s view of a rigid divide
between conscious and unconscious life, and
rejected the concept of repression.He argued that
individuals would escape from underlying
feelings of insecurity by seeking to establish a
delusional superiority, what he called a “guiding
fiction”. Since the guiding fiction is selfishly
motivated and antisocial it “must early become
unrecognizable, must assume a disguise, or it
destroys itself.” As a result, people fail to
recognize the “circuitous ways comparable to
secret paths” which are the source of their
unhappiness, despite the fact that they are of their
own construction. Adler’s brilliant insights are
deeply embedded within most of today’s theories
of psychotherapy, but Freud saw Adler’s position
as a complete rejection of his dynamic view of
the unconscious. In ejecting Adler from the
Psychoanalytic Society, he criticized Adler’s
work as no more than
ego psychology deepened by
knowledge of the psychology of the
unconscious ... Adler has tried to bring
us, who gathered together to
investigate the vicissitudes of the libido,
nearer to surface psychology. (Colby,
1958: 71, 73)
Of all contemporary formulations, Langs’
perspective seems particularly close to the spirit
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of Freud. Cognitive therapists echo Adler’s
approach. It is negative attitudes and beliefs
about the self, which lie hidden behind intricate
patterns of avoidance and compensation, which
constitute the unconscious or tacit source of
much of our unhappiness. This converges with
the perspective of object relations therapists who
see the root of our problems in fixated or
damaged interpersonal schemas laid down in the
early months of life, and the unconscious
attempts individuals make to make sense of a life
founded on such a ‘basic fault’, to use Balint’s
famous phrase. In all this, Langs argues, what has
got lost is those aspects of psychological life that
seem to call forth most clearly the metaphor of
depth, and which Freud championed in his
conflicts with Adler. He criticizes contemporary
psychoanalysts in a manner that echoes Freud’s
rejection of Adler a little less than a century ago:
the fundamentals of the emotion-
processing mind have gone virtually
unrecognized ... . Indeed the entire
realm of deep unconscious experience
has been neglected (1996: 200).
For this reason, Langs might not be comfortable
with Teasdale’s (1996) fundamentally cognitive
stance. However, Teasdale agrees with him that
there are two parallel and distinct cognitive
modes of encoding meaning into language, which
he calls the propositional and implicational.
These coincide exactly with Lang’s theoretic and
mythic. Because the systems are functionally
separate, changes in one system do not
necessarily generalize to the other. This means
that evolution also lies behind the familiar
dilemma for psychotherapists: that apparently
helpful insights turn out to be hollow in terms of
promoting meaningful change. Making
something conscious in the sense that it is
rendered in propositional code, may not address
meaning at the implicit or implicational level.
Teasdale also points out that, by their very
nature, propositional formulations never fully
capture the subtleties and nuances that can be
conveyed by implicational expression. This why
poetry can often convey something that cannot be
easily explained in propositional code. This is
explored in the movie Il Postino. Mario befriends
a famous poet, Pablo Neruda, and gradually
becomes intrigued by his encounter with poetry.
On one occasion, Mario tells Neruda how a line
in his poem has expressed an aspect of his
experience which he could not himself have put
into words: ‘I liked it too when you wrote, “I’m
tired of being a man.” That’s happened to me too,
but I never knew how to say it. I really liked it
when I read it.’
Then he asks Neruda to explain another line, ‘the
smell of barber shops makes me sob out loud.’
But Neruda refuses. ‘I can’t tell you in words
different from those I’ve used. When you explain
it, poetry becomesbanal’ (Il Postino soundtrack).
This simple observation points to the limits of
relying on insight in psychotherapy and points to
the value of techniques which use expressive
methods involving poetry, dramatization,
imagery and metaphor (Bolton 2001; Edwards
1990; Lyddon and Alford 2000). These work
directly with mythic or implicational language.
They not only capture the richness of
implicational meaning, but can also contribute to
changing it, without having to explain it. Langs’
use of clients’ narratives of everyday events as
communications that automatically encode deep
unconscious meanings is another way of working
directly at the implicational level.
At its most reductionistic, for cognitive
therapists, tacit knowledge and implicational
meaning are simply those aspects of procedural
knowledge which aren’t connected to the
language system. Although most object relations
theorists might eschew this laboratory-based
language, their position is much the same.
However, many cognitive therapists, including
Teasdale, have a secret life as transpersonal
theorists. From a transpersonal perspective,
expressive media such as poetry, drama, painting,
sculpture and dance do more than express the
unformulated experiences of pre-verbal and often
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infantile cognitive structures. The unconscious is
not a hidden programme inside us, it is a shared
spiritual field that is all around us and in which
we all inevitably participate. Jung was the first
clear exponent of this perspective within
twentieth century psychotherapy. He argued that
beyond the unconscious material that could be
linked directly to an individual’s biography, lay a
‘deeper layer of the unconscious where the
primordial images common to humanity lie
sleeping’ (1942: 64). This was ‘the collective
unconscious’ — he also called it ‘an impersonal
or transpersonal unconscious’ —the site of
‘ancient thought-forms ... as much feelings as
thoughts’ which were ‘deposits of the constantly
repeated experiences of humanity’ (1958b: 68),
which had ‘taken aeons to form’ (1948, 93) and
which are the inheritance of all, whatever their
race or culture. This was more than a memory
bank; it was a separate reality with its own
autonomous existence. Thus he refers to it as ‘an
internal spiritual world whose existence we never
suspected’ (1942: 76). It is a source of ‘an
endless and self-replenishing abundance of living
creatures, a wealth beyond our fathoming’ (Jung
1946: 177). Furthermore, these ‘living entities ...
exert an attractive force upon the conscious
mind’ (1934: 142). These ‘archetypes’ or
‘dominants’ were powerful spiritual forces with
‘their own independent life’ (1942: 65). ‘There is
some justification,’ he observed, ‘for the old
view of the soul as an objective reality’ (1931a:
347).
This transpersonal view gained further impetus
from the cultural impact of the widespread
experimentation, especially since the early 1960s,
with psychedelic substances and intensive
spiritual practices such as meditation and trance
dancing. Such experimentation was not confined
to individuals of low IQ, hippies and dropouts.
Many significant figures within the medical,
psychiatric and psychological community were
involved in personal experiential practices and
with coming to terms with the implications of
their experiences for psychological theory. One
of the most articulate contemporary exponents of
this position is Stan Grof, whose book, The
Cosmic game, presents a bold synthesis of
transpersonal insights from psychotherapy with
spiritual truths articulated by the classic spritual
traditions. He argues that psychedelic
experiences disclose the fundamentally spiritual
nature of existence:
The psyche in each of us is essentially
commensurate with all existence and
ultimately identical with the cosmic
creative principle itself ... spirituality is
affirmed as ... a critical dimension of the
human psyche and of the universal
scheme of things. (1998: 3)
It has, of course, been unfashionable for over a
century to found psychology on spiritual
principles. Such a bold exposition of the
transpersonal perspective challenges the
fundamental ideological presuppositions which
our training has unconsciously equipped us with.
Yet unless we can take it seriously, we will never
understand the world of African traditional
healers whose perspective is similar. For
example, Credo Mutwa, a Zulu healer, writes,
behind life there is something fantastic ... things
that are just as wonderful — if not more so —
than those things that we do see. We ... delude
ourselves ... that we are masters of our own
destiny ... there are forces guiding us about which
we know nothing (1996, 202)
For transpersonal practitioners, whether they are
traditional shamanistic healers in Africa or
elsewhere, or western trained psychotherapists
influenced by contemporary transpersonal
psychology, the fact that we can experience
mythic worlds with great intensity does not
simply mean that mind can imaginatively
translate everyday human dilemmas into vivid
narratives that include superhuman figures and
ghoulish monsters. These worlds have their own
existence independent of the narrow band take on
reality which passes for consciousness in the
mundane world. The challenge the transpersonal
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perspective presents is that ultimately, unless we
reckon with these, our psychological
understanding will never be complete.
So far, I have been reviewing some of the
prominent perspectives on the unconscious
within contemporary psychology. Now let me
turn to something different: the way in which the
term ‘the unconscious’ itself functions like a
mythic entity both for psychologists and within
the culture at large. If myths provide images and
ideas which point beyond the surface of
consensual public reality to other realities which
are equally important but less easily rendered in
words, then phrases of the form ‘the ********
unconscious’ often serve the function of myth.
Such phrases first became popular in nineteenth
century Germany. But they have lost nothing of
their fascination and power and, still today, serve
as a tool for discourse in a variety ways. The
psychotherapy literature is garnished liberally
with terms like these. For Jung, ‘the collective
unconscious’ points to an underlying spiritual
matrix within which the individual experience of
all of us is embedded. Contemporary
psychoanalysts use the term ‘the dynamic
unconscious’ to point to the same territory which
Breuer addressed with his images of he Titans
under the volcanic Etna or of tuning fork
resonating to unseen vibrations. Ken Wilber uses
the term ‘emergent unconscious’ to refer to what
romantic poets had called the power of the
imagination: the creative and transformational
forces which may reveal themselves in dreams,
images, art and mythic narrative. The feminist
psychoanalyst, Lynne Layton speaks of ‘the
heterosexist unconscious’ and ‘the normative
unconscious’ to refer to the familial and cultural
norms that automatically mould our attitudes and
behaviour towards gender roles and to the wider
socio-cultural matrix which is permeated by a
complex network of ideological control
mechanisms which maintain the values of what
she calls ‘hegemonic masculinity and femininity’
(1998: 45).
Such phrases do not usually indicate that a
precise map is being offered of a specific
‘domain’ or ‘part of the mind’. They function,
rather, as discourse markers indicating that
unconscious influences on experience and/or
behaviour are being addressed which share some
broad commonality. The ‘******’ in these
phrases points in the direction of the nature of
that commonality. These phrases also imply that
what is being referred to affects everyone in a
similar way. Thus a term like ‘the heterosexist
unconscious’ suggests that we are all influenced
by a hidden matrix of the same kind of gendered
assumptions. This is why Reid (1999: 58), who
warns of the effect of ‘unconscious cultural
values’ on the perspectives and feelings of
clients, does not speak of a ‘cultural
unconscious’. His emphasis is on the diversity of
the ‘hidden cultures’ (1999: 64) within which
clients and therapists are inevitably embedded.
Apparent ‘resistance’ from clients and failures of
empathy by therapists often stem from the
‘culture blindness’ (1999: 78) unwittingly
instilled by psychotherapy training which fails to
alert trainees to the subtle impacts of the
multiplicity of cultural perspectives.
These phrases, together with others such as ‘the
unconscious mind’ or ‘the subconscious mind’
also exercise a strong fascination since they
imply something powerful, mysterious and
beyond our control. This is why, in
hypnotherapy, suggestions may be given that the
client is allowing his or her unconscious mind to
assume control. Dowd (2000: 124), who is a
cognitive therapist, avoids speaking of the
unconscious when he is talking psychological
theory. Here his choice is a propositional
language that employs terms like ‘tacit
knowledge’ and ‘implicit learning’, which come
from contemporary cognitive science. However,
when using hypnosis, he is quite willing to use
the phrase ‘unconscious mind’ as a metaphor
which will appeal to the client. For example, he
might say, ‘So your conscious mind, which you
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use to pay attention, can take a vacation, can step
aside and let your unconscious mind take over...’.
Discourses with an advocacy agenda draw on this
fascination when they use phrases like ‘the
heterosexist unconscious’. The message is, ‘Here
are hidden forces which deeply affect us and
which we ignore at our peril.’ Roszak (1993,
1994) uses ‘the ecological unconscious’ and
Aizenstat (1995: 95) the ‘world unconscious’, in
this way, in warning of the dangers posed by
threats to the environment. This is also a
transpersonal concept, since these authors see it
as an aspect of the collective unconscious which
‘shelters the compacted ecological intelligence of
our species’ (Roszak 1993: 306). Like the ancient
concept of anima mundi (world soul) it refers to
an underlying holistic field within which ‘all
creatures and things of the world are interrelated
and connected’ (Aizenstat 1995: 95-6). Through
attuning to this field, individuals can experience
the world not, as they normally do, in terms of
the values of human material comfort and the
single-minded promotion of economic growth,
but in terms of the needs of all species on the
planet. This presents a new perspective on the
struggles and suffering of other life forms
resulting from human activities which are
systematically damaging the ecosystems on
which they depend, and causing an accelerating
extinction of species.
The ecological unconscious is generally part of
the shadow (in Jung’s terms). We keep it
unconscious because it is painful to recognize our
alienation from nature and the harm our species
is perpetrating. However, this alienation creates
its own pain. ‘The voice of the earth is that close
by,’ writes Roszak (1993: 305), ‘if we are, as the
Romantic poets believed, born with the gift of
hearing that voice, then turning a deaf ear to her
appeal ... must be painful.’ Ecopsychologists
point to several ways of creating dialogue with
the ecological unconscious. Wilderness retreats
provide a means of fostering empathic
attunement to the natural world. When we ‘step
into the looking glass of nature and contact
wilderness,’ writes Harper (1995: 185), ‘we
uncover a wisdom much larger than our small
everyday selves.’ They also promote
confrontation with the unacknowledged pain
either on the retreat itself or when individuals
return to the everyday world and see afresh the
ecological insensitivity which characterizes the
way we mostly live (Greenway 1995). Dreams
(Aizenstat 1995) and psychotherapy methods
which induce altered states of consciousness
(Grof 1998) can also give rise to encounters with
the ecological unconscious, and integration of
these experiences can significantly enhance
individuals’ awareness and concern regarding
ecological issues.
Finally I will look at the work of Bynum (1999)
who advances the concept of ‘the African
unconscious.’ He summarizes palaeontological
and genetic research which have provided major
advances in the understanding of the evolution of
our species, We now know without a doubt that
our species evolved in Africa: 4 million years
ago, the australopithecines began walking
upright; 2_ million years ago, homo habilis, with
a markedly larger brain, made use of tools; some
1.7 million years ago, the more advanced homo
erectus could use fire and was the first hominid
species to venture outside Africa. Our own
species, homo sapiens, evolved in East Africa
some 300 000 years ago; perhaps only 90 000
years ago, a small number made it out of Africa,
where they consolidated a genetic heritage which
would serve as the basis for the species in the rest
of the world: there is evidence of homo sapiens
in Malaysia 75 00 years ago, and in Australia
shortly after that. By 30 000 years ago they had
spread to South America, Western Europe,
Northern Russia and Japan (Caird 1994). The
separation of races with their distinctive hair,
skin colour, and facial and bodily features, has
been underway for less than 100 000 years and
perhaps as little as 30 000. ‘Before that, Bynum
(1999: 11) suggests, ‘all humankind was dark-
skinned and Africoid.’ Consequently, he
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concludes, all of us ‘are interwoven on the loom
of a primordial African unconscious’ (1999:
xxv).
However, Bynum spreads the net even wider as
he tells us that ‘African unconscious’ also
connotes the personal and spiritual qualities
which mark a distinctively African mode of
experience. From this perspective, all things are
experienced as interconnected and energized by
an underlying life force; an affinity for rhythm,
both bodily and musically, finds spontaneous
expression in healing rituals, and consciousness
is communally oriented rather than
individualistic. Paradoxically, it can be thought
of both as unconscious, in that it is experienced
without being reflected on, and as a distinctive
mode of shared consciousness. While this may be
the lived experience of black (African) people,
for Europeans it is part of the shadow, in Jung’s
sense. For centuries, Europeans have culturally
repressed dimensions of psychological
experience associated with their African roots
and despised Africans and other blacks as
primitive, emotionally uninhibited and lacking in
intelligence. For Westerners to reconnect with
their repressed African unconscious, argues
Bynum, would offer a much needed correction to
the materialistic and driven modes of
consciousness which dominate their culture.
Bynum’s African unconscious has yet another
facet: The ancient Egyptians believed that a
spiritual world underlies the world of
appearances, and that individuals can become
profoundly transformed if they engage in the
right kinds of spiritual practice. These ideas,
argues Bynum, were essentially an African
discovery which developed within the first
human civilisation, which began to establish
itself in Nubia and Egypt in the Nile Valley,
some 15 000 years ago. The African unconscious
thus provides the basis for the potential for
human spiritual transformation. It has other
transpersonal aspects: the values and perspectives
associated with it are, he believes, transmitted not
only genetically and culturally, but also through
an interactive field which functions ‘like a
conscious and living world Internet’ (1999: 100).
Bynum’s arguments could throw light on a
famous dream of Jung’s. He was deeply affected
by the silence and spaciousness of Africa as well
as by the natural dignity of the Africans
themselves. During his 1925 visit, he dreamed of
an American Negro barber who was making his
hair black and curly. The image frightened Jung
and he interpreted it as a warning that he must
not to allow himself to be swept away from his
European roots: ‘the primitive was a danger to
me. At that time I was obviously all too close to
“going back”’ (1977: 302), he wrote. Jung’s life
was lived in dialogue with the deep spiritual
heritage which Bynum subsumes under ‘the
African unconscious’ and we have seen the
affinities between his approach to psychotherapy
and the practices of shamans. That he could so
strongly recoil from whatever it was that he
experienced as ‘primitive’ might indeed indicate
an alienation from some ancient roots that is
deeply embedded in European civilization.
Those who have no identification with Africa or
being African might feel that Bynum has
somehow hijacked the unconscious for his own
political ends. Many of Bynum’s concerns and
perspectives coincide with those of other writers.
Metzner (1994), for example, has pointed out
how shamanic practices have been suppressed in
the West for some 2000 years and points to the
history of persecution of so-called ‘witches’ and
practitioners of natural healing. He shares with
Bynum the view that contemporary interest in
ancient spiritual practices can be understood as a
‘return of the repressed’ at a collective level.
While Bynum uses these ideas to promote a
consciousness (or an unconscious) that is
specifically black or African, Metzner (1993)
offers them as a focus for revisioning the nature
of ‘European consciousness.’ Grof and Harner
(1995) have shown how rituals of spiritual
transformation are found worldwide in the
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shamanic traditions. In the myth of the journey of
the hero or heroine, an ordinary man or woman
leaves his/her simple home, ventures to a strange
land, encounters obstacles in the form of natural
hazards, monstrous creatures and fierce enemies,
undergoes some form of serious illness,
dissolution or death, is miraculously restored to
life, and eventually returns to his/her simple town
or village, with gifts of healing and wisdom
which are offered to the people. Campbell (1956)
showed how this underlying structure is found
again and again in the myths of culturally
different peoples all around the world and points
to the fact that the potential for spiritual
transformation has been encountered and realized
time and time again throughout history and
across the world. Can Bynum legitimately claim
this as distinctively African?
Let me warn you that this is not the right question
because it will lead us into futile turf wars which
will be anything but transformational. A
discourse analytic approach allows us to see
Bynum’s interweaving of so many diverse
themes under the rubric of ‘the African
unconscious’ as the imaginative forging of a
contemporary myth of origin for Africans and
those of African descent, a myth which could
serve to enhance the dignity, integrity and
spiritual purpose of contemporary black people.
Myths of origin, stories of how a particular
people came to inhabit a particular land and
developed their unique culture, are a central
mechanism for developing a sense of cultural
unity and solidarity. Bynum’s use of the concept
of ‘the African unconscious’ is part of a political
discourse of advocacy which serves to shake up
Western stereotypes of ‘Black’ and ‘African’ and
offers an imaginative foundation for the dignity
of black people all over the world. As such he
appropriates the mythic term ‘the unconscious’
and uses it to offer a much needed cultural
corrective to the degrading and disempowering
images and narratives which unconsciously
influence all of us, both black and white, in our
perceptions of racial differences.
To conclude, let me summarize some of the
points made in this paper. First, so pervasive are
the unconscious factors that shape our lives both
individually and collectively that it is inevitable
that myths and metaphors will abound in our
attempts to bring these factors to awareness.
These myths and metaphors may in part render
our scientific understanding more palatable, but
they also point to the limitations of the
ideological assumptions associated with science
in dealing with the scope of human experience.
Second, if we follow Langs, we have evolved in
such a way that repression is an inevitable part of
our coping ability in a world that is complex and
inevitably painful. The dialectic between
conscious and unconscious aspects of our
experience is a part of human existence, and
myth and metaphor will always play a central
role within that dialectic. Finally, a phrase like
‘the ******* unconscious’ is a tool of human
discourse which helps us embrace the complexity
that can lie hidden below the surface of culturally
constructed consensual experience. As such it
operates much more like a mythic symbol than a
scientific concept.
To conclude then, I think I have shown that ‘the
unconscious’ is a slippery term, with multiple
meanings. Yet it points to profound existential
truths about the nature of human life. So let me
end with another mythic figure from Greek
mythology: Proteus was the prophetic old man of
the sea, who was believed to live on the island of
Pharos, near the mouth of the Nile. People
wanted to consult him because he knew all
things, past, present and future. However he did
not freely provide information and you had to
catch him while he had his siesta at lunch time
and tie him up. This task was complicated by the
fact that he was a shapeshifter — he could
change into a range of different shapes which
often allowed him to escape. However, if one
could hold him fast, he would at last return to his
proper shape, and provide the information that
was sought.Then he would plunge into the sea
and disappear.
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I began with the myth of Typhon which
dramatizes an intuition about the roots of much
destructive and self-defeating behaviour, a
territory often referred to as the dynamic
unconscious. By contrast, Proteus portrays a
different and positive side of the unconscious, as
a source of creativity, understanding and healing
power. These powerful images remind us of the
dilemmas and predicaments that confront us
today as psychotherapists. The monstrous figures
that lurk in the unconscious are not easily
confronted and tamed, and the priceless gifts that
the unconscious conceals are not easily tracked
down or lightly bestowed. We have our own
brand of mythic terms in which to talk to each
other and to those clients whom we serve. The
unconscious with its thoroughly Protean face, is
surely one of the most prominent of these.
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